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Abstract: I start by arguing that Mackie’s claim that there are no objective values is a 
nonsensical one. I do this by ‘assembling reminders’ of the correct use of the term ‘values’ and 
by examining the grammar of moral propositions à la Wittgenstein. I also examine Hare’s 
thought experiment which is used to demonstrate “that no real issue can be built around the 
objectivity or otherwise of moral values” before briefly looking at Mackie’s ‘argument from 
queerness’. In the final section I propose that Robert Arrington’s ‘conceptual relativism’, 
inspired by Wittgenstein, helps to make our use of moral language more perspicuous and avoids 
the problems faced by Mackie. 
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* * * 
Introduction 
 
John Mackie has suggested that he has conducted an ontological investigation 
into moral and aesthetic values and has found that they “are not part of the fabric of the 
world”2. Section I of this paper will examine Mackie’s arguments for these claims in 
some detail. In section II (i) I look at Mackie’s claim that he is conducting an 
ontological investigation and argue that, despite what he says, he is making 
recommendations about how evaluative concepts should be employed rather than 
engaging in any kind of ontological investigation. Then in section II (ii) I argue that his 
claim that there are no objective values is either nonsensical or could perhaps be 
construed as a reminder of the correct use of the term ‘values’. In section III I scrutinise 
R. M. Hare’s argument in objection to Mackie that “no real issue can be built around the 
objectivity or otherwise of moral values”3 and claim that Mackie is too quick to dismiss 
this objection from Hare. Having argued in section II that Mackie’s central claim is 
nonsensical I suggest that the ‘queerness’ he attributes to claims about moral values is a 
result of conceptual confusion (section IV). Finally, in sections V and VI, I present a 
                                                          
1 PhD’s candidate in Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Email: robert_vinten@yahoo.com.  
2 Mackie, J. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, London: Penguin, 1990, p.15 (originally published by 
Pelican books, 1977) 
3 Hare, R. M. ‘Errors and the Phenomenology of Value’ in Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1993. 
Mackie’s error theory: a Wittgensteinian critique 
 
                      Kínesis, Vol. VII, n° 13, Julho 2015, p.30-47 31 
Wittgensteinian alternative to Mackie’s account and distinguish it from Jonathan 
Dancy’s particularism. I conclude that although Mackie is right to reject Platonic 
objectivism his own position involves similar confusions. If we have a clear view of the 
use of the relevant expressions then we will recognise that both ‘there are no objective 
values’ and ‘there are objective values’ are nonsense. 
 
1. Mackie’s arguments 
 
In 1977 John Mackie’s book concerning meta-ethics and moral epistemology, 
Ethics, was published. In it he made the controversial claim that there are no objective 
values. Unlike his similarly controversial predecessors, the logical positivists, Mackie 
maintained that claims which point to something objectively prescriptive are both 
meaningful and truth-apt. This suggests that moral knowledge is possible. However, 
Mackie also argued that any moral claim that purported to pick out something 
objectively prescriptive was false4. Given that one cannot know something that is false 
there can be no knowledge of facts about what is to be valued and what is to be 
condemned. So Mackie’s position can be described as a kind of moral scepticism (a 
description that Mackie himself is happy to accept5). 
 This does not mean that we cannot distinguish between kind acts and cruel ones. 
We can describe acts as cruel or kind based on facts about people’s behaviour but we 
cannot make true claims about kindness being good or cruelty being something to be 
condemned6, according to Mackie. Whereas Mackie wants to claim that values, 
obligations, and moral requirements are not part of the ‘fabric of the world’7, the 
behaviours which can be described as cruel or kind are part of the fabric (or ‘furniture’) 
of the world8. 
 Mackie claims that his central thesis, that there are no objective values, is an 
ontological one and not a linguistic or conceptual one. According to Mackie, his claim 
is about what exists and not a claim about the meaning of ethical terms. He argues for 
                                                          
4 “[…] although most people in making moral judgements implicitly claim, among other things, to be 
pointing to something objectively prescriptive, these claims are all false” Mackie, J. L. Ethics, p.35 
Earlier in the book he says that, “…value statements cannot be either true or false”, Ethics, p.25. So, 
Mackie’s position is that moral judgements are nonsensical, although they also involve implicit claims “to 
be pointing to something objectively prescriptive” which are false. 
5 Mackie, J. L. Ethics, p.16 
6 Mackie, J. L. Ethics, p.17 
7 Mackie, J. L. Ethics, p.15 
8 Mackie, J. L. Ethics, p.16 
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this by drawing an analogy with perception. He says that just as the question ‘what is 
perception?’ cannot be exhaustively answered by giving an account of what ‘perceive’, 
‘see’, and ‘hear’ mean, the question ‘what is goodness?’ (or ‘what are values?’) cannot 
be answered by finding out what ‘good’ means. Even after we’ve said what ‘perceive’, 
‘see’, and ‘hear’ mean we still haven’t told people anything about what goes on when 
someone perceives something. Mackie goes on to suggest that, “[w]hether Boyle and 
Locke were right about [whether colours are powers of objects to produce sensations in 
us] cannot be settled by finding out how we use colour words and what we mean in 
using them”9. His conclusion is that answering the question ‘what is goodness?’ will 
inevitably involve an ontological investigation and not just a conceptual one. 
 An objection to Mackie’s thesis comes from R. M. Hare. Hare argues, “that no 
real issue can be built around the objectivity or otherwise of moral values”10. He argues 
for this by using a kind of thought experiment: 
 
Think of one world into whose fabric values are objectively built; and 
think of another in which those values have been annihilated. And 
remember that in both worlds the people go on being concerned about 
the same things – there is no difference in the ‘subjective’ concern 
which people have for things, only in their ‘objective’ value. Now I 
ask, ‘What is the difference between the states of affairs in these two 
worlds?’ Can any answer be given except ‘None whatever’?11 
 
 
Mackie takes this objection to be similar to the logical positivist’s objection to 
the distinction between phenomenalist and commonsense realist views of the world. 
The logical positivists objected that there is no experiential difference between the two 
cases. We cannot verify that we inhabit one or the other and so the question of which 
one we inhabit is a pseudoquestion. 
 Mackie responds to Hare’s objection by saying that there would be a difference 
between the world in which there are objective values and the world in which objective 
values had been obliterated. In the first case there would be something to back up the 
subjective concerns that people have. Mackie then presents us with a conditional claim; 
“[i]f we reject the positivism that would make the dispute between realists and 
phenomenalists a pseudo-question, we can reject Hare’s similarly supported dismissal 
                                                          
9 Mackie, J. L. Ethics, p.20 
10 Hare, R. M. ‘Errors and the Phenomenology of Value’ in Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1993. 
11 Hare, R. M. cited on p.21 of Mackie’s Ethics. 
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of the objectivity of values”12 and I take it that he thinks that the antecedent of the 
conditional holds (i.e. that we can reject positivism).  
 At the end of the first chapter of Ethics Mackie presents two arguments13 in 
favour of his central thesis; that there are no objective values. In this paper I will focus 
on the second of his two arguments: the argument from queerness. Mackie suggests that 
the argument divides into two parts; a metaphysical one and an epistemological one. 
The ‘metaphysical’ argument is that, “If there were objective values, then they would be 
entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything 
else in the universe.” The world does not contain entities, qualities or relations that are 
strange in this way and so there are no objective values. The ‘epistemological’ argument 
is that, “…if we were aware of them [objective values], it would have to be by some 
special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways 
of knowing everything else” and since we do not have such a faculty we cannot be 
aware of objective values (and so we don’t have any good reason to think that they 
exist)14. 
 
2. Is Mackie engaged in a conceptual investigation? 
 
(i) Wittgenstein and grammar 
 
Wittgenstein’s conception of grammar from his later philosophy is useful in 
thinking about Mackie’s claims. When Wittgenstein talks about the grammar of a word, 
what he is talking about is the linguistic rules governing the use of that word. 
Wittgenstein’s use of the notion of grammar was broader than that typically used by 
grammarians and Wittgenstein was not particularly concerned with the rules that fill 
grammar books. A grammatical rule such as “if a verb follows the word to in English 
then it is called an infinitive and it is not the main verb” does not have obvious 
philosophical applications and Wittgenstein’s concern was with untangling conceptual 
confusions involved in philosophical problems. One example of a rule of grammar 
mentioned in Wittgenstein’s the Blue Book is “of course I know what I wish”. 
Wittgenstein thinks this can be interpreted as a rule of grammar partly because what it 
                                                          
12 Mackie, J. L. Ethics, p.22 
13 ‘The argument from relativity’ and ‘the argument from queerness’, Ethics, pp.35-42 
14 Mackie, J. L. Ethics, p.38 
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says cannot be interpreted as a report of what I know. The reason that it cannot be a 
report of what I know, and the reason that it counts as a rule of grammar is that what it 
is asserting is that doubt is logically excluded in this case and similar cases. In genuine 
cases of knowledge doubt has been excluded but the cases are also ones about which it 
makes sense to express doubt (so doubt is not logically excluded). For example, “I 
know that the Willis Tower in Chicago is taller than the Empire State Building”, is a 
case of something which somebody might know but which, at another time, they might 
doubt (or which somebody else might doubt). As Wittgenstein says, “[in the sentence 
‘of course I know what I wish’] ‘of course I know’ could here be replaced by ‘Of course 
there is no doubt’. In this way the answer ‘Of course I know what I wish can be 
interpreted as a grammatical statement.”15 Other examples of grammatical rules in the 
Blue Book include “13 x 18 inches won’t go into 3 feet”, “the colours green and blue 
can’t be in the same place simultaneously”, and “6 foot is 6 inches longer than 5 foot 
6”16. 
Grammar is the description of and clarification of the rules of language17. These 
rules determine what it makes sense to say (and to write and to think). Wittgenstein’s 
conception of grammar includes rules of grammar that do not usually appear in 
grammar books and there are sentences that are well constructed according to the rules 
found in grammar books but which nonetheless do not make sense. Chomsky’s case: 
“colourless green ideas sleep furiously” is an example of such a sentence. Chomsky 
described the sentence as nonsensical but grammatical18. However, according to 
Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘grammar’ the sentence would be both nonsensical and 
ungrammatical. In fact there would be no nonsensical sentences that were grammatical 
according to Wittgenstein. Grammar is a description of the rules for making sense. Any 
sentence that is nonsensical must have violated one of these rules. 
 When the philosopher G. E. Moore heard Wittgenstein speaking in this way 
about grammar he thought that Wittgenstein was using the term ‘grammar’ in an odd 
sense. It is tempting to think that Wittgenstein has expanded the use of the word 
‘grammar’ in his later work to include rules that we would not usually think of as 
grammatical rules (or perhaps not think of as rules at all) and so Wittgenstein’s use is a 
                                                          
15 Wittgenstein, L. the Blue Book, p.30 
16 Wittgenstein, L. the Blue Book, p.56 
17 See Philosophical Investigations, §496: “Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed 
in order to fulfil its purpose… It only describes, and in no way explains, the use of signs”. 
18 Chomsky, N. Syntactic Structures, The Hague/Paris: Mouton, p.15 
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technical one, or a term-of-art. However, although it is fair to say that examples like 
those found in the Blue Book do not fill grammar books, Wittgenstein himself insisted 
that his rules were just like those found in grammar books and he was not stretching the 
use of the word ‘grammar’: 
 
Grammatical rules are all of the same kind, but it is not the same 
mistake if a man breaks one as if he breaks another. If he uses ‘was’ 
instead of ‘were’ it causes no confusion; but in the other example the 
analogy with physical space (c.f. two people in the same chair) does 
cause confusion. When we say we can’t think of two colours in the 
same place we make the mistake of thinking that this is a 
proposition19, though it is not; and we would never try to say it if we 
were not mislead by an analogy. It is misleading to use the word 
‘can’t’ because it suggests a wrong analogy. We should say ‘It makes 
no sense to say…’20 
 
Grammatical remarks then are remarks that authorise or prohibit a certain way of 
speaking. In the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein warns against confusing 
grammatical remarks with empirical ones (PI, §251) and suggests that doing so is a 
source of philosophical confusion21. Wittgenstein suggests that, ‘our preoccupation with 
the method of science [i.e. with empirical matters as discussed by the scientist]… is the 
real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness… 
Philosophy really is ‘purely descriptive’.”22 I will suggest that Mackie is guilty of just 
this sort of mistake. He conceives of the claim that ‘there are no objective values’ as an 
‘ontological’ one, i.e. a claim about what exists. However, an examination of the 
ordinary and correct use of the term ‘values’ reveals that this sentence is either nonsense 
or could perhaps serve as a grammatical reminder that it makes no sense to speak of 
values as entities or as part of the fabric of the world. That is, it prohibits sentences 





                                                          
19 Presumably Wittgenstein’s point here is that ‘two colours cannot be in the same place’, when thought 
of as philosophically problematic, is a grammatical remark rather than an empirical proposition. 
20 Wittgenstein, L. Lectures 1930-1932 (Desmond Lee ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1980, pp.97-8 
21 For example, in the Blue Book, Wittgenstein suggests that the philosophical problem he has been 
discussing concerning the notion of ‘thinking’, “…was not a scientific [empirical] one; but a 
[grammatical] muddle felt as a problem.” p.6 
22 Wittgenstein, L. The Blue and Brown Books, New York: Harper and Row, 1958, p.18 
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(ii) Mackie and nonsense 
 
On the very first page of the first chapter of Ethics Mackie presents his thesis 
that, “[t]here are no objective values”23. Later on in the chapter he offers alternative 
versions of the thesis. He says that he is asserting that, “there do not exist entities or 
relations of a certain kind, objective values or requirements”24; that, “if there were 
objective values they would presumably belong to kinds of things or actions or states of 
affairs”25 and then in presenting his argument from queerness he says that, “[i]f there 
were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very 
strange sort”26. 
It is unclear whether values are supposed to be entities, things, actions, states of 
affairs or things belonging to them, namely qualities or features of things, actions, or 
states of affairs. But perhaps this lack of clarity does not matter because Mackie wants 
to claim that values do not fit into any of these categories. According to Mackie, there is 
nothing in existence that is objectively intrinsically prescriptive – no entity, property, 
state of affairs, or action. 
But it is worth pondering these claims. Is the claim that ‘there are no entities that 
are values’ true or false or something else? When someone says that two groups of 
people share common values do they mean that those two groups of people share some 
entities? It is clear that they do not mean this. Nicky Morgan, British Education 
Secretary, has said that young children must learn British values27. Does she mean that 
they must learn some entities? No sense can be made of such a claim. So it seems that it 
is a matter of meaning or a matter of ‘grammar’ that ‘there are no entities that are 
values’. The point is not that, as a matter of fact, there are not any entities that are 
values but that nothing counts as an entity that is a value. ‘There are entities that are 
values’ does not make sense and so the denial that there are entities that are values is 
either nonsense itself or it may serve as a grammatical reminder that we cannot speak 
about values as entities and make sense. Mackie argues that he is engaged in an 
ontological investigation rather than a conceptual one but these considerations suggest 
that, contra Mackie, his investigation is in fact a conceptual one. 
                                                          
23 Mackie, J. L. Ethics, p.13  
24 Mackie, J. L. Ethics, p.17 (my italics) 
25 Mackie, J. L. Ethics, p.23 (my italics) 
26 Mackie, J. L. Ethics, p.38 (my italics) 
27 See Adams, R. ‘Nicky Morgan: toddlers must learn ‘British values’’, The Guardian, 08/08/2014 
http://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/aug/08/nicky-morgan-toddler-must-be-taught-british-values 
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I take it that in the preceding paragraph what I was doing was “marshalling 
recollections” or “assembling reminders” of the correct use of the term ‘values’ in a way 
suggested by Wittgenstein28. By looking at the way that the term ‘values’ is used, 
ordinarily and correctly, we can see that the way that it is employed by Mackie is 
abnormal or illegitimate. The use of the term ‘values’ in the claim that ‘there are no 
entities that are values’ violates our norms concerning the use of the term ‘values’. We 
do not use the term to refer to entities and cannot make any sense of using the term in 
that way.  
Mackie, however, denies that he is making a conceptual claim. He says that his 
central thesis – that there are no objective values – “is an ontological thesis, not a 
linguistic or conceptual one”29. Mackie’s claim then must be that as a matter of fact 
values do not exist. Values are not a part of the fabric of the world. But if it is not a 
linguistic thesis then presumably Mackie would accept that he can make sense of the 
idea that values might be part of the world and that there might be value-entities in it.  If 
all of the dogs in the world were to die then it would make sense to say, “there are no 
dogs in the world”. In that case one would be making an ‘ontological’ claim – a claim 
about what exists. Is Mackie’s claim similar? – Is he claiming that ‘there are no 
objectively prescriptive value-entities in the world now but perhaps at some point there 
were or that perhaps at some point there might be’? – It is difficult to see what sense can 
be made of this claim and I propose the difficulty is due to the fact that the claim does 
not make sense. 
 As we have already seen, Mackie argues that his investigation is an ontological 
one by comparing the questions, ‘what is goodness?’ and ‘what is perception?’. His 
suggestion is that neither question could be answered exhaustively by just defining the 
terms in question (‘goodness’ and ‘perception’). Leaving aside the awkward question of 
what would constitute an exhaustive answer to a question,  Mackie is mistaken in 
thinking that (i) an answer which provided a definition of ‘perception’ and (ii) an 
answer that provided an account of what goes on when somebody perceives something 
would be answers to the same question (which together exhaustively answer it). There 
                                                          
28 Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations (4th edition, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. 
Hacker, and Joachim Schulte), Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, §127. The new, 4th, edition of the 
Philosophical Investigations translates Wittgenstein’s “Die Arbeit des Philosophen ist ein 
Zusammentragen von Erinnerungen zu einem bestimmen Zweck” as “The work of the philosopher 
consists in marshalling recollections for a particular purpose”. Anscombe’s translation was “The work of 
the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose” (Philosophical Investigations, 
2nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 1958). 
29 Mackie, J. L. Ethics, p.18 
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are two questions here, namely ‘what does ‘perception’ mean?’ and ‘what goes on when 
somebody perceives something?’. In the case of ‘what is ‘goodness’?’ it is less clear 
that there are two questions. This question would be most naturally answered by giving 
some kind of definition or an explanation of meaning of the term ‘goodness’ and so it is 
a conceptual question.  
Mackie also argues that the correctness of Boyle and Locke’s thesis (that colours 
are powers of objects to produce sensations in us) cannot be settled by just examining 
the use of colour words. This is used to argue that his own philosophical claims about 
goodness and value cannot be settled by examining the terms ‘goodness’ and ‘value’. 
However, Boyle and Locke’s picture can be picked apart by looking at how we employ 
various concepts (including colour concepts). One point that can be made against them 
is that they assimilate perceptual experiences and sensations. This is not a factual matter 
because no empirical investigation could establish that perceptions were a kind of 
sensation. As Peter Hacker says, it is a matter of grammar that, “objects perceived exist 
whether perceived or not” but, “…sensations cannot exist unfelt”30. Boyle and Locke do 
not object to particular empirical claims about whether some object is red or yellow. 
Their cases are made up of a priori arguments or thought experiments which result in 
them recommending a complete reconception of our talk about perception of colour 
(and of other ‘secondary qualities’). Similarly Mackie is not concerned with rejecting 
this or that moral judgement on empirical grounds he is claiming that we need to 
completely reconceive our talk about moral states of affairs, properties, actions, and so 
on31.  
 Mackie acknowledges that the way that we ordinarily speak about values 
involves a, “claim to objectivity” and we do indeed use words like ‘know’, ‘fact’ and 
‘true’ in relation to moral statements. But Mackie argues that this does not demonstrate 
that there really is moral knowledge or that there are moral facts. Moral language, 
according to Mackie, is not self-validating. However, as Oswald Hanfling has pointed 
out, this is not because it is false that moral language is self-validating. Rather it is 
because no sense can be made of saying that moral language is self-validating. There is 
                                                          
30 Bennett, M. and Hacker, P. M. S. Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Blackwell, Oxford, 
2003, p. 121 
31 A further reason to think that he is engaged in a conceptual investigation is his methodology, which is 
‘armchair philosophy’. 
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no such thing as self-validating moral language and so we cannot conclude on this basis 
that we are wrong in using such language in relation to moral statements32.  
 
3. Hare’s objection 
 
Mackie brushes off Hare’s objection33 to his position by comparing it to the 
logical positivist’s objection to the distinction between phenomenalist and 
commonsense realist views of the world. The logical positivist A. J. Ayer argued that 
whereas there is a procedure for dealing with the question of whether a painting is by 
Goya or not, there is no similar kind of procedure for deciding whether a painting is real 
or ideal and so he suggests that the problem is “fictitious” according to his criterion 
(verifiability)34.  
 Most philosophers have now rejected verificationism and so perhaps Mackie is 
right to give it short shrift. But even assuming that Mackie can reject the logical 
positivist’s verificationism he still cannot make the argument against Hare’s objection 
so quickly. Mackie claims that, “[i]f we reject the positivism that would make the 
dispute between realists and phenomenalists a pseudo-question, we can reject Hare’s 
similarly supported dismissal of the objectivity of values” but this is not true. For one 
thing Hare is not himself a positivist. He does not share their non-cognitivist take on 
ethics. Hare thinks, “both that moral statements can be true or false, and that we can 
know them to be true or false” and adds that “I get extremely cross when people classify 
me as a non-cognitivist”35. Moreover, Hare cites Wittgenstein approvingly; saying that 
the words ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ have a use and “[i]t is a task for the philosopher to 
explain, if he can, what this use is.”36 
 In order for Mackie’s rejection of Hare to be effective Mackie would also need 
to reject other, non-verificationist, ways of showing that the dispute between realism 
and phenomenalism is not a legitimate one, including Wittgenstein’s critique of such 
                                                          
32 Hanfling, O. ‘Moral Knowledge and Moral Uncertainty’, Philosophical Investigations, 31:2, April 
2008, p.105 
33 “Think of one world into whose fabric values are objectively built; and think of another in which those 
values have been annihilated. And remember that in both worlds the people go on being concerned about 
the same things – there is no difference in the ‘subjective’ concern which people have for things, only in 
their ‘objective’ value. Now I ask, ‘What is the difference between the states of affairs in these two 
worlds?’ Can any answer be given except ‘None whatever’?” Hare, R. M. cited on p.21 of Mackie’s 
Ethics (originally from Hare’s article ‘Nothing Matters’) 
34 Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth, and Logic 
35 Hare, R. M. ‘Objective Prescriptions’, Philosophical Issues, 4, Naturalism and Normativity, 1993 
36 Hare, R. M. ‘Objective Prescriptions’, Philosophical Issues, 4, 1993, p.17 
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metaphysical views in his later philosophy37. Wittgenstein would agree with Ayer that 
there is no procedure for deciding whether a painting is real or ideal but he is not a 
positivist. Wittgenstein famously associated meaning with use in his later philosophy38. 
It remains possible that Hare’s rejection of the distinction between a, “world into whose 
fabric values are objectively built” and a world, “in which those values have been 
annihilated” could be defended on Wittgensteinian grounds. 
 Hare argues that values cannot be annihilated “[…] you cannot annihilate values 
– not values as a whole. As a matter of empirical fact, a man is a valuing creature, and is 
likely to remain so.”39 This doesn’t sound like a particularly Wittgensteinian account of 
the use of the term ‘value’ but I think that a Wittgensteinian kind of defence can be 
given of his thought experiment. Remember that in the thought experiment we are asked 
to think of one world where values are built into the fabric of the world and another 
where those values have been annihilated. I have already argued above (in section II 
(ii)) that if we look at the correct use of the term ‘values’ it becomes clear that ‘there are 
no objective values’ is nonsense (or perhaps, at a stretch, a grammatical reminder). If 
this is the case then talk of the ‘annihilation of values’, where what we are imagining is 
the destruction of entities, is also nonsense. While we can imagine the annihilation of 
valuable things (I can think of a ming vase being completely destroyed) and we can 
imagine the annihilation of creatures that value things we cannot imagine the 
annihilation of values. This is because nothing counts as the annihilation of values. The 
claim that we can imagine a world in which values have been annihilated is nonsensical. 
What is more we cannot make any sense of the claim that ‘[…] values are part of the 
fabric of the world’. If this is correct then there is nothing to verify. The claims are not 
nonsensical because they are unverifiable. Rather they are unverifiable because they are 
nonsense40. 
 
4. The argument from queerness 
 
We saw in section I that Mackie argues that were values to exist they would 
have to be, “[…] entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort” and we would 
                                                          
37 See, for example, pp.48-49 and p.59 of Wittgenstein, L. the Blue Book. 
38 “For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be 
defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical 
Investigations, §43 
39 Hare, R. M. ‘Nothing Matters’ in Applications of Moral Philosophy, London, Macmillan, 1972 
40 I could add that, as nonsense they do not even qualify as claims. 
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have to have a strange kind of faculty to apprehend them. Given the arguments made in 
the preceding sections I suggest that the reason that there is a sense of ‘queerness’ or 
‘strangeness’ surrounding the notion of objective value is that Mackie is conceptually 
confused. It is not that the ‘fabric of the world’ does not incorporate values but that it 
might; the point is that no sense can be made of the claim that the fabric of the world 
incorporates values. The claim that ‘there are no objectively prescriptive items that are 
part of the fabric of the world’ is a piece of (unobvious) nonsense. 
 
5. Some conclusions 
 
I hope that I have established that some of Mackie’s arguments do not hit their 
target and so have opened up space for an alternative kind of explanation of values and 
of morality. The kind of explanation that I have in mind is an explanation of the 
meanings of the relevant terms and the account would provide a synoptic representation 
or an overview of the conceptual territory. This would involve a close examination of 
the correct use of the expressions that are causing confusion in Mackie’s account of 
morality. The aim of such an overview would be to dissolve confusion about the notions 
of ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘goodness’, ‘obligation’, ‘morality’ and related terms. I have already 
looked at some reminders of the correct use of the term ‘values’ but I think that perhaps 
more needs to be said in order to satisfy someone who talks in the way that Mackie 
does. If we are reminded of the way that we ordinarily and correctly speak about 
morality and the way that we ordinarily talk about the truth and falsity of moral claims 
perhaps we will be less tempted to get vexed about the ‘ontology’ of values and 
goodness.  
 Looking carefully at what we say when it comes to matters of morality and 
value we will find that Mackie has got things the wrong way around. Whereas Mackie 
claims that, “[…] although most people in making moral judgements implicitly claim, 
among other things, to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive, these claims 
are all false”41 The argument of section II suggests that claims that ‘point to something 
objectively prescriptive in the world’ will turn out to be nonsensical (neither true nor 
false). Moreover, as Oswald Hanfling has pointed out, we have no good reason to think 
that people are implicitly committed to such claims in making moral judgements. 
                                                          
41 Mackie, J. L. Ethics, p.35 
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 Hanfling asks, “[h]ow should we understand the ontological commitments that 
Mackie ascribes to ordinary users of moral language? He speaks of them… in terms of 
the ‘fabric of the world’. But how is this to be understood? What is the fabric of the 
world? One might reply by reference to the materials of which it is made, such as rocks, 
metal, water, etc.: or at a more analytic level, chemicals and molecules. But the idea that 
values could find place in this company is bizarre and there is no reason to suppose that 
this is what people are committed to by their use of moral language, or that ‘linguistic 
analysis’ would reveal such a commitment”.42 
 Earlier in the book Mackie says that, “[…] value statements [as opposed to the 
claims implicit in them about objectively prescriptive values] cannot be either true or 
false”43. This claim, as Mackie recognises, conflicts with the way that we ordinarily talk 
about moral judgements. Given that Mackie’s arguments involve conceptual confusions 
I suggest that we have no good reason to give up the way that we ordinarily speak about 
moral judgements. In particular, we have no good reason to give up the claim that moral 
judgements can be true or false. 
 My aim in the preceding sections was the Wittgensteinian one of, “pass[ing] 
from unobvious nonsense to obvious nonsense” (PI, 464). Mackie’s central claim, that 
‘there are no objective values (in the fabric of the world)’, is nonsensical but it is not 
obviously nonsense in the way that a ‘sentence’ like ‘attack fighters conservative with’ 
is. It appears grammatically well formed according to the school grammarian’s rules. 
Mackie’s claim looks like sentences which do make sense such as ‘there are no chairs in 
the room’ or ‘there are no parrots depicted in the fabrics of ancient Egypt’. But, as I 
have argued, it is nonetheless ungrammatical and nonsensical. 
 
6. Synoptic representations 
 
There is nothing particularly Wittgensteinian about being clear about the correct 
use of terms such as ‘value’. Most people in their everyday lives generally do use such 
terms correctly without any problem. The more difficult task, and the one which could 
with some right be described as Wittgensteinian, is to have a clear view of the 
interrelationships between moral terms with a view to dissolving philosophical 
problems such as the one posed by Mackie. In the Philosophical Investigations 
                                                          
42 Hanfling, O. Philosophy and Ordinary Language, Routledge, 2000, p.147 
43 Mackie, J. L. Ethics, p.25 
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Wittgenstein suggested that what we need in order to get clear about an area of 
discourse, such as moral discourse, is a surveyable representation of the use of words in 
that area (PI, §122)44. Providing a surveyable representation of a significant segment of 
moral discourse will provide an answer to the question about truth. 
 There is some controversy amongst Wittgenstein scholars about how to translate 
the expressions ‘übersichtliche Darstellung’, ‘übersichtlichkeit’, and ‘übersehen’ as they 
are used in passages, like the one just cited, in Wittgenstein’s work. There is also 
controversy about how to interpret what Wittgenstein is saying in passages such as the 
one just cited (PI, §122)45. This is not an exegetical essay about such matters. I take it 
that what we need is an overview of the way in which terms in moral discourse are used 
and of the variety of logically distinct kinds of claims made in that area. A synoptic 
representation is not theoretical, does not involve making scientific claims, and does not 
provide us with any new facts. In this case it is an overview of the grammar of our 
moral language and the purpose of providing it is to dissolve philosophical problems 
surrounding truth, knowledge, and values in morality.  
This paper has largely been focussed on the negative task of ‘destroying houses 
of cards’ (PI, §118). But Wittgenstein also saw a positive role for philosophy in 
describing the grammar of our language in order to get clearer about how our language 
works and how it fits into our lives. I do not intend to provide a positive account that 
will fill exactly the space left by Mackie’s one since I do not think that there is any need 
or place for a theory of the ontology of morality. What can be provided is a surveyable 
representation of our moral language and I think that Wittgensteinian philosophers have 
already provided quite thorough accounts of this46.  
 For example, Robert Arrington, in his book Rationalism, Realism, and 
Relativism provides a Wittgensteinian account of the grammar of moral expressions 
                                                          
44 “A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. 
– Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of 
understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing 
intermediate links. The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It 
characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?” – 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (4th edition), Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009 
45 An excellent survey of the literature can be found in Nuno Venturinha’s ‘Wittgenstein and the Natural 
History of Human Beings’ in Philosophical Anthropology. Wittgenstein’s Perspective (ed. Jesús Padilla 
Gálvez), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2010, pp.95-102 
46 See, for example, Arrington, R. Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1989 and Mounce, H. O. and Phillips, D. Z. Moral Practices, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1969. 
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under the banner of ‘conceptual relativism’47. Arrington suggests that one of the 
principal sources of philosophical confusion in the area of morality has been thinking of 
rules such as ‘it is wrong to tell a lie’ as substantive moral principles rather than as 
grammatical rules or principles. There is a temptation to regard such rules as 
generalizations and as being contingent because it seems as though they have 
exceptions. The case of someone having to lie in order to save an innocent person’s life 
has been used in objection to Kant’s claim that we must be truthful, come what may48. 
Kant’s claim really is a substantive moral principle, that we can raise objections to, 
namely the claim that ‘it is always wrong to tell a lie’. However, ‘it is always wrong to 
tell a lie’ does not say the same thing as ‘it is wrong to tell a lie’ and plays a different 
role. The claim that ‘it is always wrong to tell a lie’ is weakened, probably falsified, by 
the example of lying to save an innocent person’s life. However, we do not think of ‘it 
is wrong to tell a lie’ as being weakened every time another moral principle takes 
precedence over it49. The role of this rule is to carve out a piece of logical space. As 
Arrington says, it “establishes the presumption that anyone who has lied has acted 
wrongly”50. 
 If one is still tempted to view ‘it is wrong to tell a lie’ as a contingent 
generalization then Arrington has several questions designed to draw us away from the 
temptation. He says, 
 
If a proposition like ‘it is wrong to tell a lie’ is contingent it would be 
appropriate to ask when this was discovered. It would also be 
appropriate to inquire whether there is any kind of experimentum 
crucis that could be devised to prove it. It would make sense to inquire 
what evidence we have for the proposition and to ask whether some 
people merely believe the proposition whereas others know it the 
latter having adequate evidence for it51. 
 
We can see that propositions like ‘it is wrong to tell a lie’ are not empirical 
generalisations by looking at how they are in fact used. One thing we notice when we 
look at how they are used is that they are not used much at all by adults speaking to 
adults. The paradigmatic case in which they are used is in cases of instruction; to 
                                                          
47 Arrington, R. Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989, 
pp.248-315 
48 “Truthfulness in declarations that one cannot avoid is a human being’s duty to everyone, however great 
the disadvantage to him or to another that may result from it…” Kant, I. Practical Philosophy, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, 8: 426 p.612 
49 See Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism, p.272 
50 Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism, p.276 
51 Arrington, R. Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989, p.272 
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establish the ideas of rightness and wrongness in children. In these cases we do not 
attempt to prove to the child that it is wrong to tell a lie but to bring them into our 
(moral) way of life. Propositions such as ‘it is wrong to lie’ are used to define 
morality52. 
 But we should not take ‘it is wrong to tell a lie’ to characterize the nature of all 
of the statements in morality. We have these grammatical rules in order to be able to 
apply the terms ‘wrong’, ‘lie’, ‘morality’ and similar terms correctly in particular cases. 
As Arrington makes clear, there is a great variety of different kinds of moral 
propositions. So, for example, there are contingent claims such as ‘you ought to have 
gone to the cinema with him (because you promised)’, contingent principles such as 
‘one ought to live a simple and frugal life’, and principles of moral permissibility such 
as ‘it is permissible to commit suicide’53.  
 Once we recognise the variety of different kinds of moral proposition and their 
different roles it becomes clearer about how we can account for the truth of particular 
moral judgements. We do so by applying rules to conduct on a particular occasion. If 
someone has told a lie on a particular occasion we can apply the rule ‘it is wrong to tell 
a lie’ which sets up a presumption that what they have done is wrong. This means that, 
contra Mackie, the word ‘lie’ is already imbued with moral meaning and we cannot 
separate out the descriptive element in practice. This does not mean that we have to 
consult the grammatical rules of morality each time we make a moral judgement any 
more than we have to consult the grammatical rules of colour expressions when we 
make judgements about colour. But these rules must nonetheless be operative and are 
available for consultation if there is confusion about meaning. 
 The kind of account just outlined sounds superficially like another recent 
position in moral philosophy, namely the particularism of Jonathan Dancy. We have 
already seen that moral rules are rarely consulted and this account also suggests that we 
could get by making judgements without having to have any substantive moral 
principles. Arrington says that, “[m]ost of us…live our moral lives piecemeal, dealing 
situation by situation with the moral dimensions that confront us and trying to decide in 
each case where our duty lies… [W]e resist the simple solution proffered by the 
universal principle or rule, thinking that it fosters more moral harm than good”54. Indeed 
                                                          
52 Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism, p275 
53 See Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism, pp.302-3 for a more detailed taxonomy. 
54 Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism, pp.278-9 
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Arrington could accept the claim made in Dancy’s definition of particularism, “the 
possibility of moral thought and judgement does not depend on the provision of a 
suitable supply of moral principles”55, as long as ‘principles’ is taken here to mean 
‘substantive moral principles’ as opposed to grammatical rules. The difference is that 
Arrington conceives of claims like ‘it is wrong to tell a lie’ and ‘one ought to keep one’s 
promises’ as grammatical rules and sees them as central to thinking about truth in 




So I have argued first of all that Mackie is conceptually confused in trying to 
argue for the claim that there are no objective values. His claim that values are not part 
of the fabric of the world is nonsensical. However, this negative deconstruction of 
Mackie’s account may leave some unsatisfied and wondering how it is that moral 
judgements can be true or false, or if they are true or false at all. In section VI we saw 
that Robert Arrington’s Wittgensteinian account of the conceptual territory in moral 
philosophy can be used to provide at least the beginnings of an answer to that question. 
 Wittgenstein may well have said that Mackie has not put the question marks 
deep enough down56. Mackie rejects the Platonic view that values are prescriptive and 
objective57 but then adopts the mirror image of this view in claiming that values are not 
part of the fabric of the world. I hope that I have shown that there is a plausible third 
option here which is to regard both sides of this apparent antinomy as nonsense. As 
Frank Ramsey said, “[i]t is a heuristic maxim that the truth lies not in one of the two 
disputed views but in some third possibility which has not yet been thought of, which 
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